Abstract. We present a generic method to secure various widely-used cryptosystems against arbitrary side-channel leakage, as long as the leakage adheres three restrictions: first, it is bounded per observation but in total can be arbitrary large. Second, memory parts leak independently, and, third, the randomness that is used for certain operations comes from a simple (non-uniform) distribution. As a fundamental building block, we construct a scheme to store a cryptographic secret such that it remains information theoretically hidden, even given arbitrary continuous leakage from the storage. To this end, we use a randomized encoding and develop a method to securely refresh these encodings even in the presence of leakage. We then show that our encoding scheme exhibits an efficient additive homomorphism which can be used to protect important cryptographic tasks such as identification, signing and encryption. More precisely, we propose efficient implementations of the Okamoto identification scheme, and of an ElGamal-based cryptosystem with security against continuous leakage, as long as the leakage adheres the above mentioned restrictions. We prove security of the Okamoto scheme under the DL assumption and CCA2 security of our encryption scheme under the DDH assumption.
Introduction
Recently, a large body of work attempts to analyze the effectiveness of side-channel countermeasures in a mathematically rigorous way. These works propose a physical model incorporating a (mostly broad) class of side-channel attacks and design new cryptographic schemes that provably withstand them under certain assumptions about the physical hardware (see, e.g., [30, 16, 17, 21, 10, 6, 29] and many more). By now we have seen new constructions for many important cryptographic primitives such as digital signature and public key encryption schemes that are provably secure against surprisingly broad classes of leakage attacks.
Unfortunately, most of these new constructions are rather complicated non-standard schemes, often relying on a heavy cryptographic machinery, which makes them less appealing for implementations on computationally limited devices. In this work, we take a different approach: instead of developing new cryptographic schemes, we ask the natural question whether standard, widely-used cryptosystems can be implemented efficiently such that they remain secure in the presence of continuous bounded leakage. We answer this question affirmatively, and show a generic way that "compiles" various common cryptosystems into schemes that remain secure against a broad class of leakage attacks.
Similar to earlier work, we make certain restrictions on the leakage. We follow the work of Dziembowski and Pietrzak [16] , and allow the leakage to be arbitrary as long as the following two restrictions are satisfied:
1. Bounded leakage: the amount of leakage in each round is bounded to λ bits (but overall can be arbitrary large). 2. Independent leakage: the computation can be structured into rounds, where each such round leaks independently (we define the notion of a "round" below).
In addition to these two restrictions, we require that our device has access to a source of correlated randomness generated in a leak-free way -e.g., computed by a simple leak free component. We elaborate in the following on our leakage restrictions.
Our Leakage Model
ON THE BOUNDED LEAKAGE ASSUMPTION. Most recent work on leakage resilient cryptography requires that the leakage is bounded per observation to some fraction of the secret key. This models the observation that in practice many side-channel attacks only exploit a polylogarithmic amount of information, and typically require thousands of observations until the single key can be recovered. This is, for instance, the case for DPA-based attacks where the power consumption is modeled by a weighted sum of the computation's intermediate values. We would like to mention that all our results also remain true in the entropy loss model, i.e., we do not necessarily require that the leakage is bounded to λ bits, but rather only need that the min entropy of the state remains sufficiently high even after given the leakage.
ON INDEPENDENT LEAKAGES. The assumption that different parts of the memory leak independentlyoriginally put forward by Micali and Reyzin [30] as the physical axiom "only computation leaks information" -constitutes a spatial restriction of the leakage and has been used in several works [30, 16, 33, 26, 17] (and more). In this paper, we assume that the memory of the device is divided into three parts L, R and C where (L, C) and (R, C) leak independently. To use the independent leakage assumption, we structure the computation into rounds, where each round only accesses either (L, C) or (R, C). One may object now that leakage is a global phenomenon. Indeed, this is true and many important leakage functions, for instance, the power consumption of a device modeled by the Hamming weight, are rather a global function of the computation's intermediate values. We would like to emphasize, however, that many relevant global leakage functions can be computed from just local leakages. This is not only true for the prominent Hamming weight leakage, but more generally, for any affine leakage function. Hence, independent leakages still allow for a broad class of practically relevant global leakage functions.
i A i · B i = 0. 3 Second, we use O in a very limited way, namely, we need it only when we refresh the secret key (cf. Section 1.3 for further discussion on this). Finally, O does not take any inputs, and hence its computation is completely oblivious of the actual computation (e.g., encryption or signing) that is carried out by the device. Moreover, this property gives rise to an alternative implementation as pointed out by Faust et al. [18] : instead of assuming leak-free computation, we can have O simply read its output one by one from a pre-computed list. Thus, it suffices to have leak-proof one-time storage instead of leak-proof computation. This may be an option if the computation is performed only a bounded number of times.
We would also like to emphasize that a leak-free component that does not take any inputs is much harder to attack by side-channel analysis, as successful attacks usually require some choice (or at least knowledge) over the inputs that are taken by the device. Also, we would like to stress that such a component can be tested (regarding its side-channel resistance) independently of the environment in which it is going to be used eventually.
We will further discuss our model and how it relates to earlier work in the next sections.
Leakage Resilient Implementation of Standard Cryptographic Schemes
As outlined in the introduction, many recent works in leakage resilient cryptography design new cryptographic schemes that remain secure against certain (often very broad) classes of leakages. While the design of new cryptographic schemes with built-in leakage resilience is a very important research direction, we believe that most current results suffer from one of the following weaknesses:
1. For many security related tasks such as authentication or confidentiality of data, certain cryptographic schemes have become part of widely used international standards. Even if desirable, it is unlikely that in near future these standards will be adjusted to include recent scientific progress from leakage resilient cryptography. 2. Even though by now schemes that remain secure in surprisingly powerful leakage models have been proposed, they are often very complicated, rely on non-standard complexity assumptions and are often rather inefficient.
In this work, we take a different approach and propose general techniques that allow to implement efficiently standard cryptographic schemes that remain provably secure in the above described leakage model. Before we given an overview of our contributions in the next section, we discuss some related literature that has dealt with similar questions before.
LEAKAGE RESILIENT CIRCUIT COMPILERS. One fundamental question in leakage resilient cryptography is whether any computation can be implemented in a way that resists certain side-channel leakages. This question has been studied in a series of works and dates back to the work of Ishai et al. [24] . They propose a circuit compiler that transforms any Boolean circuit into one that is secure against an adversary who reads off the values from a bounded number of wires. This work has recently been extended by Faust et al. [18] to consider larger classes of computationally bounded leakages -e.g., the leakage is modeled by an AC0 circuit that takes as input the entire state of the circuit. While these schemes only achieve security against restricted function classes (either probing attacks or AC0), the works of Juma and Vahlis [25] and Goldwasser and Rothblum [21] study the question whether any computation can be implemented in a way that withstands arbitrary polynomial-time computable leakages. As a building block these schemes use a public-key encryption scheme and essentially encrypt the entire computation of the circuit. More precisely, the approach of Juma and Vahlis makes use of fully homomorphic encryption, while Goldwasser and Rothblum generate for each Boolean wire of the circuit a new key pair and encrypt the current value on the wire using the corresponding key. We would like to emphasize that all circuit compilers (except for the one of Ishai et al.) require leak-free components. Notice also that the two latter works require the independent leakage assumption: while Juma and Vahlis use -similar to us -a device whose memory is divided into two parts, Goldwasser and Rothblum assume that essentially every individual gate (of the original circuit) leaks independently.
LEAKAGE RESILIENT ELGAMAL. While circuit compilers allow to secure any (cryptographic) computation against leakage, they typically suffer from a large efficiency overhead. A recent work of Kiltz and Pietrzak [26] takes on this efficiency challenges and shows that certain standard cryptographic schemes can be implemented efficiently in a leakage resilient way. The authors propose an efficient "bilinear version" of the ElGamal encryption scheme that is CCA1-secure even if the computation from the decryption process leaks information. The main weakness of this work is that the security proof is given in the generic group model. That is, group elements are modeled as uniformly random values and to perform a group operation or compute a bilinear map one has to query an oracle. Such a proof only implies that there are no "generic" leakage attacks that would work on any underlying group, i.e., it shows security against any attack that is independent of the representation of the group elements.
Our contribution
We continue this line of research and show a generic method to implement various standard cryptographic schemes that are provably secure in the above described leakage model. More precisely, we propose efficient and simple implementations of the Okamoto authentication/signature scheme and show that standard security properties (such as existentially unforgeability) carry over under continuous leakage attacks. Moreover, we prove that a simple variant of the ElGamal encryption scheme is CCA2 secure in the random oracle model even if the decryption process leaks continuously. We also discuss why our techniques are fairly general and may find applications for the secure implementation of various other cryptographic schemes. As a fundamental tool, we introduce an information theoretically secure scheme to refresh an encoded secret in the presence of continuous leakage. We detail on our results below.
LEAKAGE RESILIENT REFRESHING OF ENCODED SECRETS. Recently, Davi et al. [9] introduced the notion of leakage resilient storage (LRS). Such a scheme encodes a secret S such that given partial knowledge about the encoding an adversary does not obtain any knowledge about the encoded secret S. One of their instantiations relies on the inner product two-source extractor introduced in the seminal work of Chor and Goldreich [8] . Essentially, in this scheme the secret S is encoded as a pair (L, R) ∈ F n × F n , where F is some finite field, and L, R := i L i · R i = S. Unfortunately, the construction of Davi et al. has one important weakness: it can trivially be broken if an adversary continuously leaks from the two parts L and R. The first contribution of this paper is to avoid such attacks and propose an efficient refreshing scheme for the inner product based encoding. To make such a refreshing secure against continuous leakage attacks, we divide the memory of the device into three parts L, R and C, where initially (L, R) are chosen uniformly subject to the constraint that L, R = S, and C is empty. Our refreshing scheme Refresh takes as input (L, R) and outputs a fresh encoding (L , R ) of S. The computation of Refresh will be structured into several rounds, where in each round we only touch either (L, C) or (R, C), but never L and R at the same time. We will allow the adversary to adaptively leak a bounded amount of information from (L, C) and (R, C). In fact, this is the only assumption we make, i.e., we do not require that the rounds of the computation leak independently. Since in our protocol the third part C is only used to "communicate" information between L and R, we will usually describe our schemes in form of a 2-party protocol: one party, P L , is controlling L, while the second party, P R , holds R. The third part C is used to store messages that are exchanged between the parties. Hence, instead of saying that we allow the adversary to retrieve information from (L, C) and (R, C), we can say that the leakage functions take as inputs all variables that are in the view of P L or P R .
Our protocol for the refreshing uses the following basic idea. Suppose initially P L holds L and P R holds R with L, R = S, then we proceed as follows:
1. P L chooses a vector X that is orthogonal to L, i.e., L, X = 0, and sends it over to P R . 2. P R computes R := R + X and chooses a vector Y that is orthogonal to R and sends it over to
The output of the protocol is (L , R ). By simple linear algebra it follows that L, R = L , R = S. One could also hope that this scheme remains secure in the presence of continuous leakage attacks. Perhaps counterintuitive, we show (cf. Appendix D.1) that this simple protocol can be completely broken if the leakage function can be evaluated on (L, X, Y ) and (R, X, Y ). To prevent this attack, we need a method for P L to send a random X to P R in an "oblivious" way, i.e., without actually learning anything about X, besides of the fact that X is orthogonal to L (and symmetrically a similar protocol for P R sending Y to P L ). We propose an efficient protocol that achieves this property by making use of our source of correlated randomness (A, B) ← O. Notice that even given access to such a distribution, the refreshing of an encoded secret is a non-trivial task, as, e.g., just computing L = L + A and R = R + B does not preserve the secret.
The protocol that we eventually construct in Figure 1 solves actually a more general problem: we will consider schemes for storing vectors S ∈ F m , and the encoding of a secret S will be a random pair (L, R) where L is a vector of length n and R is an n × m-matrix (where n m is some parameter), and S = L · R.
LEAKAGE RESILIENT AUTHENTICATION AND SIGNATURES. We then use our protocol for refreshing an encoded secret as a building block to efficiently implement standard authentication and signature schemes in a way that withstands leakage attacks. More concretely, we show that under the DL assumption a simple implementation of the widely-used Okamoto authentication scheme is secure against impersonation attacks even if the prover's computation leaks continuously. Using the standard Fiat-Shamir heuristic, we can turn our protocol into a leakage resilient signature scheme. At a high level, our transformation of the standard Okamoto scheme encodes the original secret keys with our inner product based encoding scheme. Then, we carry out the computation of the prover in "encoded form", and finally after each execution of the prover, we refresh the encoded secrets using our leakage resilient refreshing scheme. To carry out the computation of the prover in an encoded, and hence, in a leakage resilient way, we make use of the following two observations about the inner product based encoding:
1. it exhibits an additive homomorphism, i.e., if we encode two secrets S 1 , S 2 as (L, Q) and (L, R), then (L, Q + R) represents an encoding of S 1 + S 2 . Moreover, if Q and R are stored on the same memory part, then this computation can be carried out in a leakage resilient way.
2. for two secrets S 1 and S 2 and two group generators g 1 and g 2 , it allows to compute g
in a leakage-resilient way. To illustrate this, suppose that S 1 is encoded by (L, Q) and S 2 is encoded by (L, R). A protocol to compute g
proceeds then as follows. P R computes the vector A := g
Rn 2
and sends it over to
1 , . . . , A Ln n ) and finally it computes g
Together with our scheme for refreshing the inner product encoding, these both basic components suffice to implement the standard Okamoto authentication scheme in a leakage resilient way (cf. Section 4).
LEAKAGE RESILIENT CCA2-SECURE ENCRYPTION. As a third contribution, we show that a simple and efficient variant of the ElGamal cryptosystem can be proven to be CCA2 secure in the RO model even if the computation from the decryption process leaks continuously. We would like to emphasize that our implementation is the first construction of a leakage resilient encryption scheme that allows the leakage to depend on the target ciphertext, i.e., we allow the adversary to obtain leakage after seeing the target ciphertext. We solve this obstacle by exploiting the independent leakage assumption, i.e., we encode the secret key as (L, R) and carry out the computation using the above described protocol for secure exponentiation. This together with our protocol for refreshing the inner product encoding yields a leakage resilient implementation of an ElGamal-based encryption scheme under the DDH assumption. We would like to note that even though our scheme uses a simulation sound (SS) NIZK, our construction is rather efficient, as SS-NIZKs can be implemented efficiently via the Fiat-Shamir heuristic. Moreover, notice that the Fiat-Shamir heuristic is the only place where the random oracle assumption is used, which in particular means that we do not make any additional restrictions on the class of leakage functions, as, e.g., leakage functions can query the random oracle at any point.
A GENERAL PARADIGM FOR LEAKAGE RESILIENT IMPLEMENTATIONS. We observe that our methods for implementing cryptographic schemes is fairly general. Indeed, the two main properties that we require are 1. the secret key of the cryptosystem is an element in a finite field, and the scheme computes only a linear function of the secret key in this field, and 2. the secret key is hidden information theoretically even given the transcript that an adversary obtains when interacting with the cryptosystem.
Various other cryptosystems satisfy these properties. For instance, we can use our techniques to construct a (rather inefficient) leakage resilient CCA2-secure encryption scheme that is provably secure in the standard model.
ON THE EFFICIENCY OF OUR SCHEMES. For a statistical security parameter n, we increase the secret key size and computation complexity by a factor of n compared to the underlying schemes. That is, instead of using two group elements as secret key, our implementations need to store 3n group elements. Moreover, if the underlying scheme needs to carry out 2 exponentiations our leakage resilient implementations requires 3n exponentiations. The public key size of both the underlying cryptosystem and our implementation is identical. As already discussed above, an alternative for implementing standard cryptosystems is via leakage resilient circuit compilers. These are, however, considerably less efficient due to the following three reasons:
1. Circuit compilers typically consider the question of how to implement Boolean circuits in a leakage resilient way. Hence, to implement, e.g., the Okamoto authentication, one first needs to "compile" the scheme into a Boolean circuit and only then implements it using the techniques from the leakage resilient circuit compilers. Our techniques are more direct and do not require such a detour via Boolean circuits. 2. Non-linear operations (e.g., AND that is heavily needed for exponentiations and multiplications) are significantly more expensive than the implementation of linear operations. More concretely, for any nonlinear operation the efficiency loss is quadratic in the security parameter.
3. The current circuit compilers that protect against arbitrary polynomial-time computable leakage [25, 21] either carry out the complete computation using a fully homomorphic encryption scheme, or they encrypt every bit on a wire with a new secret/public key pair. In contrast, we do not use any additional public key cryptography.
Of course, circuit compilers have an important advantage over our work. While we focus on certain cryptographic schemes, leakage resilient circuit compilers allow to implement any computation in a leakage resilient way. Hence, they may be used to implement, e.g., the AES in a leakage resilient way. We would like to point out that the scheme of Kiltz and Pietrzak [26] is considerably more efficient than our scheme and results only into a constant loss in efficiency (compared to standard ElGamal). However, this comes at the price that the security proof is done in the generic group model. Moreover, we would like to mention that in this work we settle a question raised in [26] . We propose the first encryption scheme that is CCA2 secure in the presence of leakage attacks.
ON THE LEAK-FREE COMPONENT. In our work, we require access to correlated randomness that is sampled in a leak-free way. It is interesting to see how our requirement relates to earlier work that made use of similar assumptions [20, 18, 25, 21] . We focus in the following on the results of Juma and Vahlis [25] and Goldwasser and Rothblum [21] , which both work in a similar leakage model as we do. In the work of Juma and Vahlis, the leak-free component has to sample a public/secret key pair for a fully homomorphic encryption scheme together with two ciphertexts C and C that are encryptions of 0. On the other hand, in the work of Goldwasser and Rothblum the leak free component takes as input a public key and a mode of operation, and either outputs a fresh encryption of 0 or an encryption of a random bit b. It is easy to see that the computation that is carried out by our leak-free component O is considerably simpler as it just involves a small number of simple operations. Moreover, we would like to emphasize that our component is only needed to refresh the secret key (and not for signing or decryption), while in Goldwasser and Rothblum the leakfree component is required O(k) times for every NAND gate in the original circuit (here k is the security parameter). On the positive side, we would like to note, that the entire output of the leak-free component in [21] can leak jointly, while in our case the two parts A and B have to leak independently. The same is true for the component of Juma and Vahlis where the secret key cannot leak jointly with the ciphertexts.
COMPARISON TO OTHER RELATED WORK. We would like to mention that in a series of important recent works [10, 6, 29, 28, 5] new schemes for leakage resilient signing and encryption (CPA-secure) have been proposed. While these works have an obvious advantage over our work by considering a more powerful leakage model, we would like to point out that these schemes are non-standard and rather inefficient. Furthermore, they rely on non-standard assumptions (e.g., subgroup decisional assumption), or only allow a small constant fraction (or even logarithmic fraction) of key leakage during the update process. Moreover, we would like to emphasize that the goal of our work is different: we are interested in the question whether standard cryptosystems can be efficiently implemented in a leakage resilient way. For instance, our method for storing and refreshing a secret key works generically and independently of the proposed scheme. We would like to note that Dodis et al. [12] recently introduced a method for storing and refreshing a secret. Their construction does not require leak-free components, but is rather inefficient and relies on computational assumptions. Moreover, it is not clear if it can be used for other purposes such as implementing standard cryptosystems. It is an interesting research question whether our results can be combined with the storage and refreshing scheme of [12] .
Preliminaries
For a natural number n the set {1, . . . , n} will be denoted [n] . If X is a random variable then we write x ← X for the value that the random variable takes when sampled according to the distribution of X. In this paper, we will slightly abuse notation and also denote by X the probability distribution on the range of the variable. A vector V is a row vector, and we denote by V T its transposition. We let F be a finite field and for m, n ∈ N, let F m×n denote the set of m × n-matrices over F. Typically, we use M i to denote the column vectors of the matrix M . For a matrix M ∈ F m×n and an m bit vector V ∈ F m we denote by V · M the n-element vector that results from matrix multiplication of V and M . For a natural number n by (0 n ) we will denote the vector (0, . . . , 0) of length n. We will often use the set of non-singular m × m matrices denoted by NonSing m×m (F) ⊂ F m×m . Let in the rest of this work n be the statistical and k be the computational security parameter. Let G be a group of prime order p such that log 2 (p) ≥ k. We denote by (p, G) ← G a group sampling algorithm. Let g be a generator of G, then for a (column/row) vector A ∈ Z n p we denote by g A the vector C = (g A 1 , . . . , g An ). Furthermore, let C B be the vector (g A 1 B 1 , . . . , g AnBn ). In the following, we will often omit to explicitly specify the security parameter k, and assume that the information theoretic security parameter n is a function of k.
Basic Definitions from Information Theory
We denote with U n the random variable with distribution uniform over {0, 1} n . Let X 0 , X 1 be random variables distributed over X and let Y be a random variable over a set Y, then we define the statistical distance between X 0 and X 1 as ∆(X 0 ;
) be the statistical distance conditioned on Y . For random variables X over X and Y over Y let d(X) := ∆(X; U ) and d(X|Y ) := ∆(X; U |Y ) (where U is uniform and independent from Y ). It is easy to verify that for any event E we have
For random variables X, Y we define the min-entropy of X as H ∞ (X) = − log max x∈X Pr[X = x] and the average min-entropy X given Y as [13] H ∞ (X|Y ) := − log E y←Y 2
−H∞(X|Y =y)
.
We prove some basic information theoretic lemmata that will be used throughout the paper in Appendix A.
Leakage Model
As described in the introduction, in this work we will assume that the memory of a physical device is split into two parts, which leak independently. We model this in form of a leakage game, where the adversary can adaptively learn information from each part of the memory. More formally, let L, R ∈ {0, 1} s be the two parts of the memory, then for a parameter λ ∈ N, we define a λ-leakage game played between an adaptive adversary A -called a λ-limited adversary -and a leakage oracle Ω(L, R) as follows. For some t ∈ N, the adversary A can adaptively issue a sequence {(f i , x i )} t i=1 of requests to the oracle Ω(L, R), where x i ∈ {L, R} and f i : {0, 1} s → {0, 1} λ i . For the ith query the oracle replies with f i (x i ) and we say that in this case the adversary A retrieved the value f i (x i ). The only restriction is that in total the adversary does not retrieve more than λ bits from each L and R. In the following, let Out(A, Ω(L, R)) be the output of A at the end of this game. Without loss of generality, we assume that Out(A, Ω(L, R)) := (f 1 (x 1 ), . . . , f t (x t )).
LEAKAGE FROM COMPUTATION. So far, we discussed how to model leakage from the memory of a device, where the memory is split into two parts (L, R). If the physical device carries out "some computation" using its memory (L, R), and this computation leaks information to the adversary, then we need a way to describe the leakage from such computation. As discussed in the introduction, we do this in form of a two-party protocol Π = (P L , P R ), which is executed between the two parties P L and P R and an adversary is allowed to obtain partial information (the leakage) from the internal state of the players.
Initially, the party P L holds L, while P R holds R. The execution of Π with initial inputs L and R, denoted by Π(L, R), proceeds in rounds. In each round one player is active and sends messages to the other one. These messages can depend on his input (i.e., his initial state), his local randomness, and the messages that he received in earlier rounds. Additionally, the user of the protocol (or the adversary -in case the user is malicious) may interact with the protocol, i.e., he may receive messages from the players and sends messages to them. For simplicity, we assume that messages that are sent by the user to the protocol are delivered to both parties P L and P R . At the end of the protocol's execution, the players P L and P R (resp.) may output a value L and R (resp.). These outputs may be viewed as the new internal state of the protocol and of course are not given to the adversary.
One natural way to describe the leakage of the computation (and memory) of such a protocol is to allow the adversary to adaptively pick at the beginning of each round a leakage function f and give f (state) to the adversary. Here, state contains the initial state of the active party, its local randomness and the messages sent and received during this round by her. Indeed, in our setting, we allow the adversary to learn such leakages. However, to simplify exposition, we consider actually a stronger model, and use the concept of a leakage game introduced earlier in this section. More precisely, for player P x ∈ {P L , P R }, we denote the local randomness that is used by P x during the execution of Π(L, R) as ρ x , and all the messages that are received or sent (including the messages from the user of the protocol) by M x . At any point in time, we allow the adversary A to play a λ-leakage game against the leakage oracle
A technical problem may arise if A asks for leakages before sending regular messages to the players. In such a case parts of M x may be undefined, and for simplicity, we will set them to constant 0. For some initial state (L, R), we denote the output of A after this process with A (Π(L, R) → (L , R )). As we are interested in the continuous leakage setting, we will mostly consider an adversary that runs in
, where the current initial state of this round is (L i−1 , R i−1 ) and the new state of P L and P R will be
, we assume that the players P L and P R erase their current state except for their new state L i and R i , respectively. More precisely, for the ith execution of A Π(
, we let the adversary interact with the leakage oracle Ω(
denotes the randomness used during this execution, and (M i L , M i R ) denotes the messages that the players send and receive. If A is a λ-limited adversary, then we allow him to learn up to λ bits from the oracle in each such execution.
Leakage-resilient Storage
Davi et al. [9] recently introduced the notion of leakage-resilient storage (LRS) Φ = (Encode, Decode). An LRS allows to store a secret in an "encoded form" such that even given leakage from the encoding no adversary learns information about the encoded values. One of the constructions that the authors propose uses two source extractors and can be shown to be secure in the independent leakage model. More precisely, an LRS for the independent leakage model is defined for message space M and encoding space L × R as follows:
-Encode : M → L × R is a probabilistic, efficiently computable function and -Decode : L × R → M is a deterministic, efficiently computable function such that for every S ∈ M we have Decode(Encode(S)) = S.
An LRS Φ is said to be (λ, )-secure, if for any S, S ∈ M and any λ-limited adversary A, we have
where (L, R) := Encode(S) and (L , R ) := Encode(S ).
In this paper, we consider a leakage-resilient storage scheme that allows to efficiently store elements S ∈ F m for some m ∈ N. Namely, we propose Φ
The following lemma shows that Φ n,m F is a secure LRS. The proof uses the fact that an inner product over a finite field is a two-source extractor [8, 35] and appears in Appendix C. Lemma 1. Let m, n ∈ N with m < n and let
The following is an instantiation of Lemma 1 for concrete parameters.
Proof (of Corollary 1). In Lemma 1 set δ = 0.10 and γ := |F| −n/10 . It is easy to see that for such a choice of parameters (as defined in Lemma 1) is negligible. We also have that λ is equal to 0.4n log |F|−n log |F| /10, which is equal to 0.3 · |F n |.
Leakage-Resilient Refreshing of LRS
An obvious drawback of an LRS is the fact that the total leakage from the memory is bounded by some small constant λ. Indeed, if an adversary can continuously learn information from the encoded secret (L, R) ← Encode(S), then after a few observations L and R are completely known, and the adversary can trivially break the LRS. To solve this problem, we need a method of "pumping" new randomness into the encoding. To this end, we show how to securely refresh an LRS encoding. More precisely, we will develop a probabilistic protocol (L , R ) ← Refresh(L, R) that securely refreshes (L, R), even when the adversary can continuously observe the computation from the refreshing process. The only additional assumption that we make is that the protocol has access to a simple leak-free source O of correlated randomness. For a secret S and a leakage-resilient storage Φ = (Encode, Decode) with message space M, the refresh-
Initially, P L holds L and P R holds R. At any point during the execution of the protocol, the adversary can interact with a leakage oracle and learn information about the internal state of P L and P R . At the end the players output the "refreshed" encoding (L , R ), i.e., the new state of the protocol. Notice that there is no interaction between the refreshing protocol and the user of the protocol. In other words: the only way in which the adversary can "interact" with the protocol is via the leakage oracle.
For correctness, we require that Decode(L, R) = Decode(L , R ), i.e., the refreshed encoding decodes to the stored secret S. Informally, for security, we require that no λ-limited adversary can learn any significant information about S (for some parameter λ ∈ N). We will define the security of the refreshing protocol using an indistinguishability notion. Intuitively, the definition says that for any two secrets S, S ∈ M the view (i.e., the leakage) resulting from the execution of the refreshing of secret S is statistically close to the view from the refreshing of secret S . Before we formally define security of our refreshing, we consider the following experiment, which runs the refreshing protocol for rounds and lets the adversary play a leakage game in each round. For a protocol Π, an LRS Φ, an λ-bounded adversary A, ∈ N and S ∈ M, we have Exp (Π,Φ) (A, S, ):
1. For a secret S, we generate the initial encoding as (L 0 , R 0 ) ← Encode(S). 2. For i = 1 to run A against the ith round of the refreshing protocol:
The experiment outputs whatever A outputs after interacting with Π for iterations (without loss of generation we can assume that A outputs just a single bit b ∈ {0, 1}). To simplify notation, we will sometimes omit to specify Φ in Exp (Π,Φ) (A, S, ) explicitly. We are now ready to define security of a refreshing protocol.
Definition 1 (A ( , λ, )-refreshing protocol). For a LRS Φ = (Encode, Decode) with message space M, a refreshing protocol (Refresh, Φ) is ( , λ, )-secure, if for every λ-limited adversary A and any two secrets S, S ∈ M, we have that ∆(Exp (Refresh,Φ) (A, S, ); Exp (Refresh,Φ) (A, S , )) ≤ .
In the rest of this section, we construct a secure refreshing protocol for the LRS scheme Φ As already mentioned in the introduction, we will assume that the players have access to a non-uniform source of randomness. More precisely, they will access an oracle O, that samples pairs
In each iteration the players will sample the oracle twice: once for refreshing the share of P R (denote the sampled pair by (A, B)), and once for refreshing the share of P L (denote the sampled pair by (Ã,B)). The protocol is depicted on Fig. 1 . To understand the main idea behind the protocol, the reader may initially disregard the checks (in Steps 1 and 4) that L and R have full rank (these checks were introduced only to facilitate the proof and only occur with very small probability: cf. Lemma 3). The reader may also initially assume that m = 1 (the case of m > 1 is a simple generalization of the m = 1 case). The main idea of our protocol is that first the players generate the value X ∈ F n×m such that L · X = (0 m ), and then in Steps 3 the player P R sets R :
The generation of X and Y is done in an "oblivious" way: the player P R will learn X and the player P L will learn Y , but X will be secret for P R and Y will be secret for P R . In Appendix D.1, we show that a simpler, and more natural protocol, in which X and Y are generated by P L and P R (resp.) and communicated to each other is actually insecure. We now first show correctness of our protocol from Figure 1 .
Lemma 2 (Correctness of the refreshing).
Assuming that the players P L and P R did not abort, we have for any S ∈ F m : Decode n,m
Proof. As we assume that A and B have a full rank, and we check (in Steps 1 and Step 4) that L and R have full rank, by Lemma 15 in Appendix B we can sample a random solution M andM for the equations in Steps 2 and 5 (resp.). The rest of the proof follows by simple linear algebra:
where (2) follows from the construction of the protocol (Step 6), Eq. (3) follows from the linearity of the inner product, Eq. (4) comes from the fact thatM · R =B (cf.
Step 5), and (5) follows fromÃ ·B = (0, . . . , 0).
By a similar reasoning as above we get that L · M · B = A · B = (0, . . . , 0). Hence, (5) is equal to L · R, which decodes to S. This finishes the proof.
n is given to P L and R ∈ F n×m is given to P R .
Refreshing the share of P R :
1. If L does not have a full rank then the players abort. Let (A, B) ← O and give A to P L and B to P R . 2. Player P L generates a random non-singular matrix M ∈ F n×n such that L · M = A and sends it to P R . 3. Player P R sets X := M · B and R := R + X.
Refreshing the share of P L :
4. If R does not have a full rank then the players abort. Let (Ã,B) ← O and giveÃ to P L andB to P R . 5. Player P R generates a random non-singular matrixM ∈ F n×n such thatM · R =B and sends it to P L . To prove this theorem, we will need to show that any adversary A that interacts for iterations with the refreshing experiment Exp Refresh (as given in Definition 1), will only gain a negligible (in n) amount of information about the encoded secret S. Notice that this in particular means that A's interaction with the leakage oracle given in the frame of Figure 1 will not provide the adversary with information on the encoded secret. More formally, we will show that for every (λ/2 − 1)-limited A and every S, S we have:
This will be proven using the standard technique called the "hybrid argument" by creating a sequence of "hybrid distributions" -denoted by Hyb i (A, S, S , ) and Hyb i (A, S, S , ). We will show that the first distribution in this sequence is statistically very close to Exp Refresh (A, S, ), and the last one is very close to Exp Refresh (A, S , ). Moreover, each two consecutive distributions in the sequence will be very close. Hence, by applying the triangle inequality multiple times, we will obtain that Exp Refresh (A, S, ) and Exp Refresh (A, S , ) are close. Following the notation of Exp Refresh , we denote in the hybrid experiments Hyb i and Hyb i the input to the jth execution of Refresh n,m F by (L j−1 , R j−1 ), and its output by (L j , R j ). We can now define the hybrid distributions as follows. For each i ∈ [n] let Hyb i (A, S, S , ) be defined in the same way as Exp Refresh (A, S, ) (i.e., run iterations of the protocol from Fig. 1 ) except that in the ith iteration in Step 2 for the refreshing of P R 's share, instead of using the oracle O we use an oracle O that samples (A, B) from the set
Observe that this means that for j ≤ i − 1 we have L j · R j = S since we proceed as in Exp Refresh (A, S, ) for the first j executions of Refresh n,m F . As in the ith iteration for refreshing the share of P R we use the oracle O by simple calculation we get that
Since from then on we continue with using the oracle O, we get for j ≥ i that L j · R j = S . Similarly, let Hyb i (A, S, S , ) be defined in the same way as Exp Refresh (A, S, ) except that in the ith iteration of Refresh n,m F for refreshing the share of P R we sample (Ã,B) from the oracle O . Before we show in Lemma 4 that these hybrid distributions are indeed close, let us prove a simple lemma about the event Q that the players abort in the protocol. Recall that in Figure 1 P L or P R may abort the execution of the protocol, in case that L (cf.
Step 1) or R (cf.
Step 4) do not have full rank. To preserve correctness of the protocol, we reconstruct the secret in case of abortion. Obviously, in such a case the distance between the distributions will not be small anymore. Hence, we need to bound the probability that such an event occurs.
Lemma 3 (Probability of abort). For any S, we have
Proof. For each j we define the event E(j) that the players abort in the jth iteration. This means that either L j−1 or R j does not have full rank. Note that (L 0 , R 0 ) are chosen uniformly at random subject to the constraint that they encode the value S. By the construction of our protocol, it is easy to verify that this carries over to each L j and R j . In other words for each E(j) we can view L j−1 as being chosen uniformly at random and each of the m columns of R j as being chosen from an n − 1 dimensional subspace of F n . Hence, from Lemma 16 the probability that (R j ) T does not have a full rank is at most m · |F| m−n . This carries over to R j by Lemma 18 from the appendix. Clearly, L j does not have a full rank only if it is equal to (0, . . . , 0), which happens with probability |F| −n ≤ m · |F| m−n . Therefore, we get from the union-bound that for each j we have Pr[E(j)] ≤ 2m·|F| m−n and by applying again the union-bound, we get that
It is easy to see that the above Lemma 3 works also in case of the hybrid experiments, and hence for both Hyb i (A, S, S , ) and Hyb i (A, S, S , ), we have
We now have the main technical lemma of this section. Proof. We show only the proof of Point 3. The proof of the remaining points is analogous. The table below represents the inner products of L j and R j in the hybrids Hyb i (A, S, S , ) and Hyb i+1 (A, S, S , ).
It is easy to see that the only difference between Hyb i (A, S, S , ) and Hyb i+1 (A, S, S , ) is that in the former L i · R i = S and in the latter L i · R i = S. We will show that for any
We prove this by contradiction. Suppose there exists an adversary A for which Eq. (8) does not hold, then we construct a λ-limited adversary S, that we call the simulator, which will be able to break the (λ, )-security of Φ n,m F . S runs A as a sub-routine and simulates its environment according to either Hyb i (A, S, S , ) or Hyb i+1 (A, S, S , ) by just having access to its target oracle Ω(L, R). We will show that in case that Table 7 ), while in case of (L, R) ← Encode n,m F (S) the simulation is as in Hyb i+1 (A, S, S , ) (cf. (*) in Table 7 ). To this end, S "plugs" the encoding (L, R) from its target oracle into (L i , R i ), and uses access to its target oracle to simulate the leakage from Exp Refresh that depends on (L i , R i ). One main difficulty is that Exp Refresh may run for many iterations, hence, allowing the adversary to learn a large amount of information, while on the other hand S only can retrieve up to λ bits from its target oracle. To solve this problem S will simulate most leakages "off-line", i.e., without using access to its target oracle. For the ith and (i+1)th execution, however, S will use access to its target oracle to make the leakages from these rounds consistent with the "off-line" leakages. Eventually, the simulator will output whatever A outputs, or abort, in which case it outputs ⊥. We give the details below.
The adversary S will simulate A in the following way.
Pre-processing I: generating the L j and R j variables except for
and all the messages that are generated during the execution of the protocol from Figure 1 . He then sets
F (S ) and performs the remaining executions of the refreshing procedure. He stores all the variables used in these executions. Note, that the only thing that the simulator misses for the simulation of A are the variables used in the ith and (i + 1)th iteration. Pre-processing II: simulating the first i − 1 iterations: The simulator S starts A and simulates him on the variables that he generated previously for the first (i − 1) iterations of the refreshing protocol. This can be done easily, as all the variables for the simulation are known.
in the ith iteration: Now, the simulator simulates the leakage from phase i. Note that he does not know (L i , R i ) -since it is equal to (L, R) he has access to it only via the leakage oracle. We first describe how he can do it if he knows (L i , R i ) completely and later argue that it can be done also just by leaking limited amount of data from L i and R i . First, S simulates the refreshing of P R 's share. He sets
He checks if
If not, then he aborts (let Q 1 denote this event). Otherwise he chooses M ∈ NonSing n×n (F) uniformly at random and computes
He also computes
. Now, to simulate the refreshing of the share of P L , he chooses a randomM ← NonSing
He sets:
He also computesB
Note that we havẽ
The simulator also checks if the values A, B,Ã andB have a full rank (so that they look like generated by the oracle O). If not, then he aborts. Call this event Q 2 . Now, the simulator has all the variables needed to simulate the game between A and
The only problem, that we did not address so far, is that in reality the simulator has access to L i and R i only via the leakage oracle Ω(L; R). The main observation is now that the above simulation is done in such a way that the leakage function can compute (a)
First, observe that L i−1 and R i−1 are chosen by S in advance in the pre-processing I phase. Moreover, S can also choose M andM beforehand, as they are just chosen randomly from NonSing n×n (F). Hence,
can be treated as constants and "hard-wired" into the leakage function that A issues to its leakage oracle in the ith iteration. Now, to see (a) observe that A is a function of L i−1 and M (cf. (11)), which are "hard-wired" into the leakage function, andÃ is a function of L i , L i−1 andM (cf. (12) and (13)), where L i−1 andM are "hard-wired" and L i := L comes from the target oracle). To see (b) observe that B is a function of M, R i and R i−1 (cf. (9) and (10)), where M and R i−1 are "hard-wired", andB is a function ofM (a "hard-wired" value), and R i (cf. 14). Hence, the (λ/2 − 1)-leakage game run by A at the ith iteration can be simulated by S using a (λ/2)-leakage game against Ω(L; R) (the "+1" overhead comes from the fact that we need a little bit of extra space in order to communicate the fact that the simulation aborted). He then computes Y := L i+1 − L i andÃ := Y ·M −1 , and finallyB :=M · R i . He aborts in case L i · R i+1 = S (denote this event by Q 1 ), or in case one of A, B,Ã andB does not have a full rank (denote this event by Q 2 ). Similarly to (15) it is easy to calculate that
Moreover, it is easy to check that, exactly as before, the (λ/2 − 1)-leakage game performed by A in the (i + 1)th iteration can be simulated by S using a (λ/2)-leakage game against Ω(L; R). Post-processing: simulating the remaining iterations: The simulator S simulates A on the variables that he generated previously for the i + 1th,. . . , nth iteration. Exactly as in "pre-precessing II" he can do it since he generated the corresponding variables himself. At the end he outputs the output of A.
We now prove that for any b ∈ {0, 1} we have the following:
To show it, we assume that the players and the simulation did not abort (i.e., we have Q and
It is easy to see that the distributions of the variables created by the simulator and Hyb i (A, S, S , ) and Hyb i+1 (A, S, S , ) are equal for the first i − 1 iterations, and for the iterations i + 2, . . . , n. The only non-trivial things happen in the ith and (i + 1)th iteration. The main difference between Hyb i (A, S, S , ) and Hyb i+1 (A, S, S , ) can be summarized as follows:
The variables created by our simulator indeed satisfy these relations, as shown on (15) and (16) . It remains to show that the distribution of the variables generated by S when interacting with Ω(Encode n,m
F (S )) (resp.) is identical to Hyb i+1 (A, S, S , ) or Hyb i (A, S, S , ) (resp.). To this end, consider the execution of the ith iteration of Refresh n,m F in Hyb i (A, S, S , ) experiment and compare it to the simulation of the ith iteration assuming that L i · R i = S (the remaining cases can be analyzed in a similar way).
ith iteration in Hyb i (A, S, S , ):
Let us now discuss why these methods of sampling the variables are identical if the abort events do not occur. It is easy to see that in the first case, X is a random n × m matrix subject to the constraint that its column vectors are orthogonal to L i−1 . In the second case X is computed from the matrices R i and
F (S ) are sampled randomly and independently. Hence, X := R i − R i−1 is a random matrix. As on the right hand side we further assumed that L i−1 · X = (0, ...0) (i.e., the check does not fail), we have that also on the right hand side X is a random n × m matrix with column vectors that are orthogonal to L i−1 , which implies that both distributions are identical. 3. (Ã,B),M and L i : We can argue this similar to above.
It remains to bound the probability that the abort does not occur during the simulation.
Claim. In the above simulation we have:
Proof.
Since clearly L i−1 · R i has a uniform distribution over |F| m and the same holds for Q 1 , we have
We next define the events Q A , Q B , QÃ and QB as the events that the corresponding variables A, B,Ã and B do not have a full rank. Similarly, we define the events Q A , Q B , Q Ã and Q B . As M is a full rank matrix and L i−1 is a random vector in F n , we get that A is chosen uniformly at random in F n , which gives us:
Let us next consider the event Q B . It is easy to see that the rows of X T are chosen uniformly at random from the subspace of vectors that are orthogonal to L i−1 . Hence, by Lemma 16, it follows that X T has rank m with probability at least 1 − m · |F| m−n . By Lemma 18, this implies that rank(X) = m with probability at least 1 − m · |F| m−n , and by the same lemma, we get that rank(B) = m with probability at least 1 − m · |F| m−n .
As a similar argument works for QB, we get:
Next, we consider QÃ. AsM has full rank and conditioned on Q 1 the vector Y is a random vector from an n − m dimensional subspace, we get
The same arguments work for bounding Q A , Q B , Q Ã and Q B . We now get:
(25)
(26)
(27)
Eq. (24) follows from the fact that Q 1 and Q 1 are independent and (25) from Eq. (20) . Eq. (26) is a standard transformation and Eq. (27) follows from the union bound. Eq. (28) follows from Eq. (20)- (23) and m · |F| m−n ≥ |F| −n . Finally, Eq. 29 uses that (1 − 8m · |F| m−n ) ≥ 1/2 when m ≤ n/2 and n ≥ 16.
This concludes the proof.
We are now ready to obtain a contradiction:
As further S retrieves in total λ bits from each party (λ/2 in phase i and λ/2 in phase i + 1) we get a contradiction to the (λ, )-security of Φ n,m F , which concludes the proof of the lemma.
Proof (of Theorem 1). As shown in Lemma 4 conditioned on Q the distance between each consecutive distributions Exp Refresh (A, S, ), Hyb 1 (A, S, S , ), Hyb 1 (A, S, S , ), . . ., Exp Refresh (A, S , ) is at most 2 |F| 2m . Since the sequence of distributions has length 2 +2, we get by the triangle inequality (applied 2 + 1 times) that the distance between the first Exp Refresh (A, S, ) and the last distribution Exp Refresh (A, S , ) conditioned on Q is at most (2 + 1)2 |F| 2m ≤ 6 |F| 2m . With Lemma 3, we then get:
This proves (6) , and hence shows the statement of the theorem.
Combining this theorem with Corollary 1 we get the following.
Corollary 2. Let n ∈ N be the security parameter. Suppose |F| = Ω(n) and let m = o(n). Then Refresh
F , where is a polynomial in n and negl(n) is some negligible function.
Security of Refreshing with Additional Auxiliary Information
Consider a secret S ∈ M m and suppose we use our protocol in a setting where the secret is sampled from an affine subspace Z ⊆ M m of dimension m < m that is known to the adversary beforehand. 4 In such a case our security definition says that an adversary that observes leakage from the refreshing cannot learn any additional information about S. In this section, we extend our security notion and show that the above statement holds even when the adversary obtains some auxiliary information on the encodings. More precisely, for an affine subspace Z of dimension m , let W be a m × (m − m )-matrix of full rank and Q ∈ M m−m be a vector such that the solution space of S · W = Q defines the affine subspace Z. Then, we show that for any S ∈ Z and (L 0 , R 0 ) ← Encode(S), given aux i−1 = R i−1 · W from the execution of
We denote this experiment with Exp The reader may ask why such an extended security definition is useful at all. Indeed, it turns out that such an extension is helpful when we want to apply our refreshing protocol to construct leakage-resilient cryptographic schemes. We will detail on this in the next sections.
Before we show that our refreshing protocol also satisfies this stronger notion of security, notice that since the adversary can choose the leakage function after learning aux i , he can essentially leak from P L the value of
e., he can learn some linear function of the secret. The good news is that he knows S · W already because it is equal to Q! As it turns out, this is the only information that he will learn. Formally, we can show the following generalization of Theorem 1. 
Proof (sketch).
The proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 1 and we only repeat the relevant details here. In the reduction of Theorem 1, we need to build a λ-limited simulator S that can simulate the view of a (λ/2 − 1)-limited adversary in Exp aux Refresh (A, S, , W, Q). To this end, let us first consider the case when the m × (m − m )-matrix W has a special form (call it W ): namely, its 1 on its diagonal and otherwise 0. Note that knowledge of W and Q with S · W means that the first m − m coordinates of S are given to the adversary. 4 In such cases, a natural idea to make the encoding more efficient is to fix some bijection f : M m → Z and encode x ∈ M m instead of encoding f (x). This is of course possible only if f is efficiently computable. As it turns out, in some cases such f cannot be efficiently computed. This happens e.g., if we use the encoded secrets in computationally-secure protocols (e.g., the Okamoto identification scheme -cf. Sect. 4).
Let S, S ∈ Z be two vectors which are equal on their first m − m coordinates, and we denote bỹ S andS the last m coordinates of S and S , respectively. As in Theorem 1 consider Hyb i (A, S, S , ) and Hyb i+1 (A, S, S , ) which differ only in the ith and (i + 1)th round. This means for the first i − 1 executions of Refresh the simulator will refresh an encoding of S and for the last (i + 2) rounds, it refreshes and encoding of S . Notice that for j ∈ {0, . . . , i − 1, i + 2, . . . , } the simulator S can trivially generate aux j = R j · W , as R j is known completely to S.
For the simulation of the ith and (i + 1)th execution S uses access to its target oracle Ω(L, R), where The general case, i.e., when W is an arbitrary matrix, follows from the fact that every W ∈ F m×(m−m ) can be transformed to this special form W by multiplying it (from the left side) by some non-singular matrix N ∈ F m×m (let W = N · W ). Hence, we can adjust the computation that is carried out by the simulator by multiplying the appropriate variables by N .
Identification and Signature Schemes
In an identification scheme ID a prover attempts to prove its identity to a verifier. For a security parameter k, ID consists out of three PPT algorithms ID = (KeyGen, P, V):
It outputs the public parameters of the scheme and a valid key pair. The public key is known to both the prover P and the verifier V. -(P(pk , sk ), V(pk )): An interactive protocol in which P tries to convince V of its identity by using his secret key sk . The verifier V outputs either accept or reject.
We require that ID is complete. This means that an honest prover will always be accepted by the verifier. To define (black-box) security of an identification scheme ID, we consider a polynomial-time adversary A that gets the public key pk and interacts with the prover P(pk , sk ) playing the role of a verifier. At the end of this interaction the adversary tries to impersonate P(pk , sk ) by engaging in an interaction with V(sk ). The adversary successfully impersonates the prover, if V(sk ) outputs accept. We say that the scheme is secure if every polynomial-time adversary A impersonates the prover with only negligible probability. We will now extend this standard security notion to capture leakage attacks on the prover, where the adversary obtains leakage from the prover's computation. To this end, we let the adversary take the role of V in the execution of the protocol (P(pk , sk ), V(pk )) and allow him, besides exchanging messages with the prover, to obtain leakage from the prover's execution. We denote a single execution of this process by A P(sk ) → sk , where sk may be the updated key. In the definition below, we formalize security against such an adversary.
Definition 3 (Security against Leakage and Impersonation Attacks (ID-Leak security)).
Let k ∈ N be the security parameter. An identification scheme ID = (KeyGen, P, V) is λ(k)-ID-Leak secure if for any PPT λ(k)-limited adversary A it holds that the experiment below outputs 1 with probability at most negl(k):
1. The challenger samples (pk , sk 0 ) ← KeyGen(1 k ) and gives pk to A. 2. Repeat for i = 0 . . . poly(k) times: A P(sk i ) → sk i+1 , where in each execution the adversary can interact with the honest prover and retrieves up to λ(k) bits about the current secret state sk i and the randomness that is used. 3. A impersonates the prover and interacts with V(pk ). If V(pk ) accepts, then output 1; otherwise output 0.
Notice that the adversary is allowed to obtain λ bits of information for each execution of the identification protocol. Hence, in total the adversary may learn poly(k) · λ(k) bits of information.
A Construction of a Leakage-Resilient Identification Protocol
Our construction is based on the standard Okamoto identification scheme [31] , which works as follows. Let g 1 and g 2 be two generators of G such that α = log g 1 (g 2 ) is unknown. The secret key sk is equal to (x 1 , x 2 ) ← Z 2 p and the public key pk is g
, and sends a to the verifier. 2. The verifier chooses c ← Z p and sends it to the prover. 3. The prover computes z 1 := w 1 + cx 1 and z 2 := w 2 + cx 2 and sends (z 1 , z 2 ) to the verifier.
The verifier accepts if and only if
It has been shown that the Okamoto scheme is secure against impersonation attacks under the discrete logarithms assumption. We now describe how to implement the Okamoto scheme such that it remains secure even if the computation of the prover is carried out on a leaky device. Verification is as in the standard Okamoto scheme, while the key generation and the computation of the prover is adjusted to protect against leakage attacks. More precisely, instead of using (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ Z 2 p as secret key, we store (L, (R 1 , R 2 )) ← Encode n,2 F (x 1 , x 2 ) and implement the computation of the prover as a two-party protocol run between P L (L) and P R (R 1 , R 2 ). To this end, we will use the fact that the Okamoto identification protocol only requires to compute a linear function of the encoded secret key. As outlined in the introduction such functions can be implemented in a "leakage-resilient way". The protocol is given in Figure 2 .
Finally, we will combine our identification protocol with our refreshing protocol from Section 3 to construct an identification scheme Oka = (KeyGen, P, V, Refresh n,2 Zp ) that is ID-Leak secure, i.e., secure even against a polynomial number of observations. More precisely, in the ith execution of (P(pk , (L, R)), V(pk )) after Step 5 in Figure 2 , we execute
Zp (L i , R i ) and set the prover's secret key for the next round to sk i+1 := (L i+1 , R i+1 ). Notice that in such a case, we include into the leakage oracle from the figure the variables that are used by the refreshing and let the adversary interact in each round with the following leakage oracle:
It is easy to see that the above protocol satisfies the completeness property. This is due to the soundness of the refreshing protocol, and the fact that messages that are exchanged by the parties P and V in Figure 2 are as in the original Okamoto protocol. To prove leakage-resilience of Oka = (KeyGen, P, V, Refresh n,2 Zp ), we will proceed in three steps:
Zp (S). We output sk = (L, R) and pk = (p, g1, g2, h), where h := g
Input for prover (L, R): L is given to P L and R is given to P R .
Computation of Prover P(pk , (L, R)):
Computation of Verifier V(pk ):
and sets
The value a is sent to V.
3. Pick c ∈ Zp and send it to P.
4. P R computes the n × 2 matrix Z := W + cR and sends it to P L .
The values (z1, z2) are given to V.
At any time, the adversary can play a λ-leakage game against: Ω ((L, U, Z) ; (R, W )). We set Z = 0 for leakage queries that are asked before c is fixed.
6. Accept iff g
Fig. 2. The key generation algorithm and the protocol
is an interactive protocol between a prover P and a verifier V.
1. We first consider a single execution of the protocol (P(pk , (L, R)), V(pk )) from Figure 2 and prove a simple property in the information theoretic setting. Namely, we show show that the there exists an (unbounded) simulator S(pk , aux) with access to a leakage oracle Ω(L * , R * ) that, given "some" auxiliary information aux, can simulate A(pk )'s view in A (P(L, R)) → (L , R )) (cf. Lemma 5) . In this step the analysis neglects the leakage from the refreshing process.
We next consider the setting where unbounded A runs in many iterations of
, where we also take into account that the refreshing of (L i , R i ) leaks information. We will combine our results from the last section with the simulator from Lemma 5 to show that any unbounded adversary will only learn a negligible amount of information about the secret key (cf. Lemma 6). 3. Finally, we will argue why this proves the ID-Leak security of our scheme. To this end, we rely on a recent result of Dodis et al. [3] , which shows security of the original Okamoto scheme for keys sampled from a high average min-entropy source.
We now follow the three steps given above and start by proving a simple property of a single execution of the protocol (P(pk , sk ), V(pk )) from Figure 2 . Informally speaking, we show in the lemma below that for every unbounded adversary A, there exists an unbounded simulator S that satisfies one of the following two properties:
S perfectly simulates the view of
Zp (x 1 , x 2 ), or 2. S aborts the simulation, and outputs ⊥. We denote the event that S aborts by Q.
Zp (L, R). Then for any (unbounded) λ-limited adversary A, there exists a (λ + 3 log p)-limited simulator S with access to Ω(L * , R * ) (here
F (x 1 )) and an event Q with Pr Q ≥ 1/p such that for any b ∈ {0, 1}
Here, we have that aux = (1, α) · R with α = log g 1 (g 2 ).
Notice that the simulator S only has leakage access to an encoding of a single value, namely to (L * , R * ) ← Encode n,1
F (x 1 ), while he has to simulate the leakage of the refreshing of (L, R) ← Encode n,2 x 2 ) . Notice, however, that S additionally knows aux = (1, α) · R. From aux and R * the simulator can easily compute a consistent encoding of x 2 , as we will see in the proof below.
Proof. For an unbounded adversary A, the information that is learnt by her contains (1) the messages that she receives from P, i.e., the data that she learns via black-box access to the prover, and (2) the leakage from the execution of (P(pk , (L, R)), V(pk )). More formally, we can describe this information by:
1. Messages sent by P to the adversary:
Recall that A is unbounded, hence she can compute discrete logarithms in G.
Access to the leakage oracle via Ω ((L, U, Z) ; (R, W )).
Again, as A is unbounded, she can compute the discrete logarithm of U to the basis g 1 which is the vector W 1 + αW 2 . Hence, information theoretically it suffices to consider Ω ((L, W 1 + αW 2 , Z) ; (R, W )).
We need to show that S(pk , aux) can do a perfect simulation of this view with just access to the leakage oracle.
1. Simulation of the leakage oracle as specified in 2: To this end, we need to simulate the variables from the leakage oracle:
which is done with access to Ω(L * , R * ) as follows: -The encoding of the secret (L, R): S can simulate these variables by setting L := L * and the first column of R to R 1 := R * . The second column is computed by R 2 := (aux − R * )/α. -The vectors W 1 + αW 2 and the matrix Z: As W 1 and W 2 are sampled uniformly at random, S can draw Z ← Z 2n p uniformly at random. As the vector aux and the column vector of Z span a vector space of dimension 3 and W 1 + αW 2 lies in this vector space, we can compute a consistent vector W 1 + αW 2 as a linear combination of aux and Z.
-The matrix W : Consider the following equation system:
Here, the right side of the system is fixed and known to the simulator. Further, R is fixed as above, i.e., by the target oracle and aux. Hence, in this equation system it remains to compute the matrix W .
Since by our choice of W 1 + αW 2 and Z the equation system is consistent and the last three rows of N are linearly independent, there exists a unique solution for (W 1 , W 2 ) (recall that R is fixed which reduces the space of solutions to dimension 1). Since Z was sampled uniformly at random, it is easy to verify that also (W 1 , W 2 ) is uniformly distributed conditioned on satisfying the above equation system. Hence, the distribution of the simulated W is as in the real experiment. 2. Simulation of the messages sent by the prover as specified in 1: As from the previous step the simulator knows (W 1 + αW 2 , Z), he can query its leakage oracle to obtain log g 1 (a), z 1 and z 2 . Notice that this requires S to learn 3 log p additional bits from its leakage oracle.
Finally, observe that since A may access its leakage oracle at any time (in particular before choosing c), but for the simulation from above we need to know the matrix N -in particular the value c, we let S simply guess c at the beginning of the simulation. If the guess was correct, then we perfectly simulated A(pk ) (P(pk , (L, R)) → (L , R )); otherwise the event Q occurs. As this happens with probability at least 1/p, we get the claim of the lemma.
LEAKAGE FROM -EXECUTIONS. In the lemma above, we showed that the leakage from a single execution of the protocol can be perfectly simulated. We will now use this observation and prove that the leakage from several rounds will also not help in learning much about the encoded secret (cf.
Step 2 in the above outline). This will require to refresh the encoded secret key periodically, as otherwise an adversary that continuously learns information from the device can trivially break the security. To this end, we consider Oka = (KeyGen, P, V, Refresh n,2 Zp ) and assume that after each execution of the protocol from Figure 2 , the prover executes
Zp (L, R) and sets the new secret key (for the next execution) to (L , R ). We denote such a prover by P and denote the ith execution of the identification protocol (with refreshing) by (P (pk , (L i−1 , R i−1 )), V(pk )).
Lemma 6. Let (pk , sk ) ← KeyGen(1 k ), ∈ N, α = log g 1 (g 2 ) and W the column vector (1, α). Suppose n, λ and are such that Φ n,1
Zp is (λ, )-secure. Then, for every S = (x 1 , x 2 ) and S = (x 2 , x 2 ) that correspond to the same public key pk (cf. "key generation" on Fig. 2) , and any (λ/2 − 1 − 3 log p)-limited adversary A we have that
Proof. Notice that (W, pk ) defines a 1-dimensional subspace Z ⊂ (Z p ) 2 that contains all the pairs (x 1 , x 2 ) that correspond to the public key pk . For any S, S ∈ Z and any (λ/2 − 1)-limited adversary A we have by Theorem 2 for the refreshing of Φ n,2
Zp that
(33) The above experiment considers only the leakage from the refreshing of (L i , R i ). To combine this with leakage from the identification protocol, i.e., leakage from the prover P(pk ) we use the simulation from Lemma 5. We can apply this lemma since (1) Eq. (33) is shown by reduction to the (λ, )-security of Φ n,1 Zp and (2) aux i = R i · W is know to the simulator 5 . As the simulation from Lemma 5 is perfect, but fails with probability 1 − 1/p, the error from Eq. (33) increases by at most a factor of p. Furthermore, notice that the simulation additionally needs to learn 3 log p bits from its target oracle (for Φ n,1 Zp ), which gives us the claimed statement.
The following corollary can be obtained from Lemma 6 in a similar way as Corollary 1 from Theorem 1 5 Notice that this was the whole purpose of the extension presented in Theorem 2.
Corollary 3. Let n ∈ N be the statistical security parameter. Furthermore, let (pk , sk ) ← KeyGen(1 k ), = poly(n), α = log g 1 (g 2 ) and W be the column vector (1, α). For every S = (x 1 , x 2 ) and S = (x 2 , x 2 ) that correspond to the same public key pk (cf. "key generation" on Fig. 2) , and any ((0.15 · n − 3) log p − 1)-limited adversary A we have that ∆ Exp aux P (pk ) (A, S, , W, pk ); Exp aux P (pk ) (A, S , , W, pk ) ≤ negl(n).
We can now show that our scheme Oka satisfies the security notion of Definition 3. Proof. It has been proven in Theorem 4.1 in [3] that the Okamoto scheme is secure against impersonation attacks under the DL assumption, even if the secret keys are sampled from some source with high average min entropy. From Corollary 3, we know that for any two uniformly sampled keys S := (x 1 , x 2 ), S := (x 1 , x 2 ) that correspond to the same public key pk and any ((0.15
Hence, information theoretically an adversary does not learn much about the secret key S or S , respectively, by running in the experiment Exp aux P (pk ) . More formally, by Lemma 9 in the appendix, this implies that the secret key has high average min-entropy even given the leakage and the public messages from the execution of the identification protocol (i.e., pk and a, z 1 , z 2 ). This gives us with Theorem 4.1 in [3] that our scheme is ((0.15 · n − 3) log p − 1) ID − Leak-secure under the DL assumption.
LEAKAGE RESILIENT SIGNATURES It is well known fact that the Okamoto identification protocol can be turned into a signature scheme using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic. Similarly, we can turn the scheme from Figure 2 into a leakage resilient signature scheme which can be proven secure against continuous leakage attacks in the random oracle model under the DL assumption.
Leakage Resilient Encryption
In this section, we construct an efficient encryption schemes that is secure against continuous leakage attacks. Our construction is based on a variant of the ElGamal cryptosystem and is proven secure against adaptive chosen message and leakage attacks (CCLA2) in the Random Oracle model.
Definitions
For security parameter k a public-key encryption scheme PKE = (KeyGen, Encr, Decr) consists of three PPT algorithms.
-(pk , sk ) ← KeyGen(1 k ): It outputs a valid public/secret key pair.
-c ← Encr(pk , m): That is, a probabilistic algorithm that on input some message m and the public key pk outputs a ciphertext c = Encr(pk , m). -m = Decr(sk , c): The decryption algorithm takes as input the secret key sk and a ciphertext c such that for any plaintext m we have m = Decr(sk , Encr(pk , m)).
The standard security notion for an encryption scheme is security against chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA). In a CPA attack against a public-key encryption scheme the adversary obtains pk , then picks two messages m 0 , m 1 and has to guess the bit b on input c * = Encr(pk , m b ). We can strengthen this notion by additionally allowing the adversary to ask for the decryption of chosen ciphertexts. A scheme that remains secure even if the adversary can ask for decryptions of chosen ciphertexts prior to seeing c * is said to be secure against non-adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA1 secure). If the adversary can additionally make decryption queries after seeing c * , then the scheme is said to be secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2 secure).
In the setting where computation leaks information, security against chosen plaintext and leakage attacks is not very interesting, as the adversary is not allowed to ask for decryption queries. On the other hand, the notion of CCA1/2-security can naturally be extended to the continuous leakage setting. Here, we allow the adversary to query the decryption oracle on some chosen ciphertext c, and additionally allow him to obtain a bounded amount of leakage from the decryption process. This may be repeated many times, hence, eventually the adversary may learn a large amount of information. Formally, we define security against adaptive chosen ciphertext and leakage attacks (IND-CCLA2 security) as follows.
Definition 4 (Security against Chosen Ciphertext Leakage Attacks (CCLA2)). Let k ∈ N be the security parameter. A public-key encryption scheme PKE = (KeyGen, Encr, Decr) is λ(k)-IND-CCLA2 secure if for any PPT λ(k)-limited adversary A the probability that the experiment below outputs 1 is at most 1/2 + negl(k).
1. The challenger samples b ∈ {0, 1} and (pk , sk ) ← KeyGen(1 k ). It gives pk to A. The weaker notion of CCLA1-security can be obtained by omitting Step 4 in the experiment above. Notice that the adversary is allowed to obtain λ bits of information for each decryption query. Hence, in total the adversary may learn poly(k) · λ(k) bits of information.
An Efficient IND-CCLA2-secure Encryption Scheme in the Random Oracle Model
An important tool of our encryption scheme is a simulation-sound (SS) NIZK. Informally, a NIZK proof system is said to be simulation sound, if any adversary has negligible advantage in breaking soundness (i.e., forging an accepting proof for an invalid statement), even after seeing a bounded number of proofs for (in)valid statements. We refer the reader to [4, 36] for the formal definition of NIZKs and simulation soundness. SS-NIZKs can be instantiated in the common random string model using the Groth-Sahai proof system [23] and the techniques of [22] . Unfortunately, as pointed out by Dodis et al. [11] , this results into an impractical scheme. In contrast, in the random oracle model using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [19] simulation soundness can be achieved efficiently. In particular, it has been proven in [1] that the standard ChaumPedersen protocol [7] for proving equivalence of discrete logarithms can be turned into a SS-NIZK using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic. Let in the following (Prov, Ver) denote such a non-interactive proof system for proving the equivalence of discrete logarithms.
Our scheme can be viewed as a leakage-resilient implementation of the following simple variant of the ElGamal encryption scheme using the above simulation sound NIZK obtained via the Fiat-Shamir heuristic. Let g 1 , g 2 be two generators of a prime order p group G. Let sk = (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ Z 2 p be the secret key and pk = (g 1 , g 2 , h = g
2 ) the public key. To encrypt a message m ∈ G, pick uniformly r ← Z p and compute c = (u := g r 1 , v := g r 2 , w := h r m, π), where π := Prov(u, v, r) is a NIZK proof of log g 1 (u) = log g 2 (v). To decrypt c = (u, v, w, π), verify the NIZK, and if it accepts, output w
It can easily be shown that this scheme achieves standard CCA2 security in the RO model. In this section, we will show how to implement this scheme such that it remains secure even if the decryption continuously leaks information. Similar to our transformation of the Okamoto scheme, we store the secret key ( x 2 ) and implement the computation of the decryption process as a two-party protocol run between P L (L) and P R (R). The protocol for key generation and decryption is given in Figure 3 and uses similar ideas as in our implementation of the Okamoto scheme. Finally, we will combine the protocol from Figure 3 with our refreshing protocol from Section 3 to construct an encryption scheme PKE = (KeyGen, Encr, Decr, Refresh n,2 Zp ) that is CCLA2 secure, i.e., secure even against a polynomial number of observations of the decryption process.
Zp (S). Let sk = (L, R) and pk = (p, g1, g2, h := g
Encryption Encr(pk , m) :
Sample r ← Zp uniformly at random and compute c = (u := g r 1 , v := g r 2 , w := h r m). Run the NIZK prover Prov(u, v, r) to obtain a proof π for log g 1 (u) = log g 2 (v). Return (c, π).
The protocol for decryption Decr(sk , c) :
L is given to P L and R is given to P R .
Both parties obtain c and parse it as (u, v, w, π). P L runs the NIZK verifier Ver(u, v, π) to check that π is an accepting proof. If the verification fails, then output ⊥ and stop; otherwise proceed as follows:
Notice that we can omit the leakage from the verification of the NIZK as it only includes publicly known values. At any time, the adversary can play a λ-leakage game against: Ω ((L, U ) ; R). Fig. 3 . The key generation KeyGen and the decryption process Decr of our public-key encryption scheme PKE.
SECURITY ANALYSIS OF PKE = (KeyGen, Encr, Decr, Refresh
Zp ). The formal security proof proceeds similar as the proof of security in the last section. We first show in Lemma 7 that the leakage from a single decryption query can be simulated in a perfect way with just access to a retrieving oracle Ω(L * , R * ). For this simulation to go through, we require that an adversary can only observe leakage from operations that involve the secret key, if the decryption oracle is queried on a valid ciphertexts. We call a ciphertext valid, if log g 1 (u) = log g 2 (v) holds. Notice that this is also the reason why we need NIZKs and cannot use the standard techniques to get CCA1/2 security based on hash proof systems. In the next step, we show that even when the adversary can continuously obtain leakage from the decryption, he will not be able to learn information about the encoded secret key. To this end, we will combine the scheme from Figure 3 with our refreshing protocol Refresh n,2
Zp to refresh the encoded secret key (L, R). Finally, we show in Theorem 4 that such a construction is IND-CCLA2 secure.
Zp (L, R). Then for any (unbounded) λ-limited adversary A, there exists a λ-limited simulator S with access to
where aux = (1, α) · R with α = log g 1 (g 2 ). Furthermore, we assume that c = (u, v, w, π) is a valid ciphertext (i.e., log g 1 (u) = log g 2 (v)).
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma 5. For the simulation to go through, it will be crucial that the adversary can only ask for decryptions of valid ciphertexts, i.e., in the following we consider log g 1 (u) = log g 2 (v) = r. For an unbounded adversary A, the information that is learnt from decryptions of ciphertexts c = (u, v, w, π) can be described as follows:
1. The decrypted plaintext m that corresponds to the ciphertext c. 2. Leakage from the decryption: This involves the leakage from the verification of the NIZK π and the decryption of (u, v, w). As the verification of the NIZK only uses publicly known values, the simulation is trivial and will be omitted in the following. Hence, we can describe the leakage from the decryption by access to the following leakage oracle
We need to show that S(pk , aux) can do a perfect simulation of the above described view with just access to its leakage oracle Ω(L * , R * ). In fact, given the auxiliary information aux this simulation is trivial:
1. Simulation of the leakage oracle as specified in Step 2: We consider first how to simulate the leakage oracle. In the simulation, S identifies R 1 with R * and can compute R 2 from R * and aux. As S is unbounded, given the ciphertext c, he can compute r = log g 1 (u). Together with aux the simulator can compute r(R 1 + αR 2 ), which suffices to simulate the leakage queries. 2. Simulation of the plaintext m = Decr(sk , c): Again, as S knows r it can decrypt valid ciphertexts by w · h −r .
It is easy to see that for valid ciphertexts we get a perfect simulation. Further, since S does not need to learn extra information from its leakage oracle, we get the claimed result.
In the lemma above, we showed that the leakage from a single execution of the decryption process can be perfectly simulated. We will now use this observation and prove that the leakage from several rounds will also not help in learning much about the encoded secret. This will require to refresh the encoded secret key periodically, as otherwise an adversary that continuously learns information from the device can trivially break the security. To this end, we consider PKE = (KeyGen, Encr, Decr, Refresh
Zp ) that executes after each run of the decryption process from Figure 3 , the refreshing protocol
Zp (L, R). The new secret key (i.e., for the next execution) is set to (L , R ). We denote such a decryption process by Decr . We can now prove the following:
and W the column vector (1, α). Suppose n, λ and are such that Φ n,1
Zp is (λ, )-secure and that in the experiments below the decryption process Decr (·) is only run on valid ciphertext. Then, for every S = (x 1 , x 2 ) and S = (x 2 , x 2 ) that corresponds to the same public key pk (cf. "key generation" on Proof (sketch). The proof is along the lines of Lemma 6. The only difference is that there is no need for the simulator to abort (recall that in the proof of the security of the Okamoto scheme the simulator needed to guess the value of c, that was later chosen by the simulated A, and abort if he did not guess it correctly). Hence, we save a factor of p.
Similar to the last section, we can now obtain the following corollary that plugs-in concrete numbers.
Corollary 4. Let n ∈ N be the statistical security parameter and suppose that in the experiments below the decryption process Decr (·) is only run on valid ciphertext. Furthermore, let (pk , sk ) ← KeyGen(1 k ), = poly(n), α = log g 1 (g 2 ) and W be the column vector (1, α). For every S = (x 1 , x 2 ) and S = (x 2 , x 2 ) that correspond to the same public key pk (cf. "key generation" on Fig. 3) , and any (0.15·n log p−1)-limited adversary A we have that
The above corollary says that an adversary that continuously observes the computation from the decryption process will not be able to learn any useful information about the encoded secret key. In the next theorem, we will show that such a property suffices to prove the IND-CCLA2 security of our scheme.
2. Answer valid decryption and leakage queries with sk until the adversary asks for (m 0 , m 1 ). 3. Generate the target ciphertext c * = (u * , v * , w * , π * ) by sampling (u * , v * ) such that log g 1 (u * ) = log g 2 (v * ), and computing w * = (u * )
Give (u * , v * , w * , π * ) to the adversary.
4. Answer valid decryption and leakage queries with sk . Game 5: This is as Game 4 with the following changes:
1. Sample a random (x 1 , x 2 ) and compute pk from (x 1 , x 2 ). Sample (x 1 , x 2 ) ← {(y, z)|g
2 } uniformly at random and set sk ← Encode n,2
2. Answer the decryption and leakage queries with sk until the adversary asks for (m 0 , m 1 ). 3. Generate the target ciphertext c * as in Game 3 by using (x 1 , x 2 ). 4. Answer the decryption and leakage queries with sk . The distance between Game 4 and 5 is negligible by Lemma 8 (or the corresponding Corollary 4). More precisely, we have the following claim:
Claim. The distance between Game 4 and Game 5 is negligible in n.
Proof. We show this by reduction to Lemma 8 or the corresponding Corollary 4. Suppose we have given a distinguisher D for Game 4 and 5, and we will use it to construct an adversary A that breaks Corollary 4. A needs to simulate the view of the distinguisher D either in Game 4 or Game 5. To this end, it samples (x 1 , x 2 ) at random, and samples (x 1 , x 2 ) ← {(y, z)|g
2 } uniformly at random. Furthermore, it samples the corresponding public key pk . To answer the decryption and leakage queries, A asks its challenge oracle that either replies with the decryption and the corresponding leakage either by using Decr (Encode n,2
Zp (x 1 , x 2 ), ·) or by using Decr (Encode n,2
Zp (x 1 , x 2 ), ·). Notice that here it is crucial that in Game 4 and 5 the adversary only asks for decryptions of valid cihpertexts, as the challenge oracle only replies to such queries. Next, A generates the target ciphertext c * as described in Game 4 (which is identical to Game 5) and then it continues to answer decryption and leakage queries using its challenge oracle. It is easy to see that depending on whether A's target oracle uses Decr (Encode n,2
Zp (x 1 , x 2 ), ·) the view of D is either as in Game 4 or Game 5.
It remains to show that in Game 5 the adversary's view is independent of the bit b. Hence, the guessing probability in Game 5 is at most 1/2.
Claim. The adversary's view in Game 5 is independent of the target bit b.
Proof. Consider the target ciphertext c * := (u * , v * , w * , π * ), where w * = z * · m b with z * = g
and r 1 = r 2 . We will show that z * acts as an information theoretically one-time pad. An (unbounded) adversary in Game 5 can compute from the public key pk the value log g 1 (h) = x 1 + α · x 2 . By the fact that in Game 5 the adversary only asks for valid cihpertexts (i.e., for a decryption query c = (u, v, w, π) we have log g 1 (u) = log g 2 (v)) he does not learn more than this. Furthermore, since we used in Game 5 sk ← Encode n,2
Zp (x 1 , x 2 ) to answer the leakage queries and (x 1 , x 2 ) is chosen independent of (x 1 , x 2 ), the adversary in Game 5 learns indeed no more than x 1 + α · x 2 . To sum it up, together with the information from the target ciphertext, the adversary learns:
Since α = 0 and r 1 = r 2 the 2 × 2 matrix is non-singular, and hence log g 1 (h) and log g 1 (z * ) are linearly independent.
As the distance between all games is negligible, we get the claimed result.
A General Paradigm for Leakage-Resilient Cryptographic Schemes
In the last sections, we proposed leakage-resilient implementations of standard cryptographic schemes. Namely, we showed how to implement the standard Okamoto identification scheme and a variant of the ElGamal encryption scheme such that they satisfy strong security guarantees even under continuous leakage attacks. The security proof of both schemes relied on very similar observations, namely:
1. The underlying cryptographic scheme (e.g., the Okamoto scheme or the ElGamal variant) computes only a linear function of the secret key. Notice that in the examples of the last section the linear function was essentially computed in the exponent of a group generator g. This is not a problem as long as the computation can be carried out efficiently. This was indeed the case for the schemes of the last sections. 2. The secret key is hidden information theoretically even given the protocol transcript that an adversary obtains when interacting with the underlying cryptographic scheme. In the protocols from the last section, this meant, for instance, that the secret key (x 1 , x 2 ) was information theoretically hidden even given the corresponding public key. Furthermore, for the Okamoto scheme this holds even given (a, z 1 , z 2 ), which were sent by the prover to the verifier during the execution of the identification protocol.
Various other cryptographic schemes satisfy the above properties, and hence can be made secure against continuous leakage attacks. For instance, the Pedersen commitment scheme [32] , which is informationtheoretically hiding and at the same time only requires to compute a linear function of its secrets. 6 Another example of the above paradigm is a variant of the linear Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem as presented in [37] . Notice that as in the encryption scheme from Section 5, this requires to use as a check for the validity of the ciphertexts a NIZK proof system. One can instantiate such a NIZK in the standard model using the Groth-Sahai proof system [23] . This gives us an efficient CCLA1-secure public-key encryption scheme in the standard model, and a rather inefficient CCLA2-secure scheme using the extensions of [22] . We suggest that many other standard cryptographic schemes can be proven secure following the ideas that were presented in this paper.
A Information Theoretic Definitions and Lemmata
An important primitive in our work are randomness two-source extractors, which are formally defined as follows.
Definition 5 (Two-source Extractor [8] ). Let L, R and M be three sets. A function ext :
We need some simple facts from information theory that are proven below.
Lemma 9. Let > 0 and let X, Y, Z be random variables such that I(X; Z) = 0, i.e. X and Z are independent, and ∆((X, Y ); (X, Z)) ≤ , theñ
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. SupposeH ∞ (X|Y ) < min(H ∞ (X) − 1, log −1 − 1), then we consider two cases: (a) H ∞ (X) ≤ log −1 and (b) H ∞ (X) > log −1 . Suppose (a) holds, thenH ∞ (X|Y ) < H ∞ (X) − 1, which means that there exists an algorithm A that given Y predicts X with probability at least 2 −H∞(X)+1 , i.e.,
Given such a A we can build a distinguisher D that contradicts We now recall some standard lemmata about the statistical distance (cf. e.g. [14] ).
Lemma 12. For any variables X 1 , . . . , X n we have 
B Basic Linear Algebra
Suppose m < n. Let T ∈ F m×n and C ∈ F m×n . It is a well-known fact that if T and C have full rank then there always exists a solution M ∈ NonSing n×n (F) of the equation
Furthermore, we now show a method to sample such a solution uniformly at random.
Lemma 15. Let T and C have full rank. There exists an efficient procedure that samples a solutions of the equation T · M = C uniformly at random.
Proof. The procedure is given on Fig. 4 . First, it is easy to see that this procedure indeed finds all the solutions Step 1) we have that C = T ·M is a non-singular matrix (since it is a product of two non-singular matrices) such that its first m rows are equal to the first m rows of C (so C belongs exactly to the set considered in
Step 2 . Therefore, since in Step 3 we set M = (T ) −1 C , hence this solution will always be found, and each solution has the same probability.
Lemma 16. Let , m, n ∈ N be such that m < n − . Consider the following way to sample a matrix M ∈ F m×n : each row of M is sampled independently from an n − dimensional subspace of F n . The probability that a matrix M sampled in this way has full rank is at least 1 − m · |F| −n+m+ −1 .
Proof. For every i ∈ [1, m], let E i denote the event that the ith row of M does not belong to the linear sub-space spanned by the first i − 1 rows of M . We clearly have
(as all these events are independent). It is also easy to see that for each i we have Pr [E i ] ≥ 1 − |F| −n+ +m−1 . This is because for i ≤ m the space spanned by the first i − 1 rows of M has a dimension at most m − 1, and hence the probability that a random vector sampled from a n − dimensional subspace lies in the m − 1 dimensional subspace is at least |F| −n+ +m−1 . Hence p ≥ (1 − |F| −n+ +m−1 ) m which by Bernoulli's inequality is at
Notice that in the above Lemma if = 0, then this means that M ← F m×n is sampled uniformly at random.
Lemma 17. Consider the following experiments:
Exp 0 : sample at random T 0 ∈ F m×n and C 0 ∈ F m×n of full rank, and then a random solution M 0 of C 0 = T 0 · M 0 , Exp 1 : sample at random T 1 ∈ F m×n and M 1 ∈ F n×n both of full rank, and then calculate
Then the distributions of (T 0 , M 0 , C 0 ) and (T 1 , M 1 , C 1 ) are identical.
Proof. Since C 0 is a function of T 0 and M 0 , and C 1 is the same function of T 1 and M 1 , it is enough to show that (T 0 , M 0 ) and (T 1 , M 1 ) have the same distribution. Variables (T 1 , M 1 ) and T 0 have a uniform distribution, and therefore the only thing that remains to show is that the conditional distribution of M 0 given that T 0 is fixed is uniform. This easily follows from Lemma 15. Take any non-singular k × k-matrix T 0 such that the first m rows of T 0 are equal to T 0 . Let C 0 be a random non-singular n × n-matrix whose first m rows are equal to C 0 and the other rows are chosen uniformly at random. Since C 0 is random, also C 0 is random. Therefore, since M 0 is a product of (T 0 ) −1 and a random C 0 , hence M 0 is also random.
We will also need the following well known facts from linear algebra.
Lemma 18. Let A be a (k × m)-matrix with rank m and B a (m × n)-matrix then we have
C Leakage-resilient storage
In this section we present the proof of Lemma 1. We start with the following auxiliary lemmata (that use lemmata and terms introduced in Appendix A)
C.1 Auxiliary lemmata
Lemma 19. For any λ ∈ N and any λ-limited adversary A, if L and R are independent, then L and R are independent conditioned on Out(A, Ω(L, R)), i.e.,
Proof. This directly follows from Lemma 4 in [15] .
Lemma 20. For δ > 0, λ ∈ N and any λ-limited adversary A, we have
Proof. This directly follows from Lemma 2.2 in [13] .
Consider any strong two-source extractor ext : L × R → M, then we can define a ext m :
Proof. We need to show that for sources L and
From Eq. (40), we get
The first inequality follows by Lemma 12 and the second by Lemma 14 in Appendix B. We now need to upper-bound d(ext(L, R i )|L, R 1 , . . . , R i−1 ). To this end, from Lemma 11 in Appendix B, we have that for each i ∈ [m]:
we use Lemma 10 in Appendix B, which gives us
Therefore, from Lemma 2.2 in [13] the probability that
With Eq. (41) this concludes the proof. 
Proof. Suppose that (L, R) is sampled uniformly and independently from L × R. Let E L be an event that
and let E R be an event that
From Lemma 20, we know that the probability of both of these events is at most γ, and hence, by the union-bound:
Here, (44) follows from the definition of a two-source extractor, and the fact that L and R are independent given Out(A, Ω(L, R)) (this, in turn, follows from Lemma 19 and the fact that L and R were chosen independently at random, and hence I(L, R) = 0). Eq. (45) comes form the definition of the statistical distance (cf. (1) in Section 2.1), Eq. (46) comes from the triangle inequality, and (47) from the definition of the conditional probability and the fact that we assumed that ext satisfies Property (43). Again, (48) follows from the definition of the statistical distance, and (49) comes from the fact that the statistical distance is at most equal to 1. Clearly (50) implies that ∆(Out(A, Ω(Encode(S))); Out(A, Ω(Encode(S )))) ≤ 2 |M| − 2γ.
This finishes the proof.
C.2 Proof of Lemma 1
In order to show Lemma 1 we use a technique that is an extension of the technique from [9] . In our proof we will use the fact that an inner product over a finite filed is a strong two-source extractor. This fact was first stated in the seminal work of Chor and Goldreich [8] , where it was shown for a field GF (2). Rao [35] extended this result and proved that the inner product over arbitrary finite fields F is a strong two-source extractor. More precisely, it was shown that for any finite field F, any δ > 0 and n ∈ N the function ext n F : F n × F n → F (cf. [35] , Theorem 3.1) defined as ext n F (L, R) = L, R = i L i R i is a (k ext , ext )-two source extractor, for ext = |F| (n+1)/2 2 −kext and k ext = (1/2 + δ)n log |F|, and |F| = Ω(n). Here we generalize this fact in the following way. 
D Flawed constructions of a refreshing scheme
In this section we present insecure protocols for refreshing and attacks against them. We do it for two reasons: first, the insecure protocol FlawedRefresh is easier to understand and already outlines the basic idea of the more complicated (secure) refreshing scheme Refresh. Second, on first sight FlawedRefresh looks like a secure method for refreshing the LRS. Somewhat surprisingly, as we will show in this section, the protocol FlawedRefresh can be completely broken (i.e., the adversary can recover the encoded secret S) with a simple, non-adaptive leakage attack (essentially, the only thing that we require is that the adversary can probe some parts of the memory when the computation takes place). 7 This is because if L = (0 n ) then for every X ∈ F m the set of solutions of L·R = X is an affine subspace of F n×m of dimension m(n − 1), and hence has a cardinality |F| m(n−1) .
D.1 A First Attempt for Refreshing the LRS Φ n,m F
To simplify exposition, we focus in this section on the case when m = 1. The protocol FlawedRefresh n,1 F (L, R) is given in Figure 5 . The inner box inside of the protocol description is not part of the protocol, but only needed to illustrate the leakage game that the adversary can play when running the protocol FlawedRefresh n,1
Input (L, R): L is given to P L and R is given to P R .
1. P L samples X such that X, L = 0 and sends X to P R . 2. P R sets R := R + X.
Refreshing the share of P L : It is easy to see that the protocol satisfies the correctness property as
where the first equality comes from the construction of the protocol, the second one from the linearity of the inner product, and the last one from the fact that Y, R = 0. By a symmetric reasoning we get L, R = L, R . Hence, the protocol is correct. Notice that the refreshing protocol from Figure 5 does not depend on any message sent by the adversary, thus, we may assume that the adversary plays the leakage game just before the end of the protocol. This game is depicted in the text in the frame on Fig. 5 . Furthermore, notice that as L and R are functions of (L, X, Y ) and (R, X, Y ) respectively, we do not explicitly need to include them into the inputs of the oracle Ω.
At first glance, the protocol shown in Figure 5 looks like a promising candidate for a secure refreshing protocol, as the secrets L and R held by the players get completely "refreshed" by adding to them a highentropy vectors Y and X (resp.). In the attack below, we will show that unfortunately such a simple refreshing protocol is not secure. F and recovers the encoded message S after = n rounds of the refreshing protocol. Let L j−1 and R j−1 denote the shares held by the players P L and P R at the beginning of the jth round. Let further X j , Y j denote the randomness sampled for the refreshing in the jth round of the protocol. This means that in the jth round the adversary can interact with the leakage oracle Ω(L j−1 , X j , Y j ; R j−1 , X j , Y j ). We will show how a (2 |F|)-limited adversary A can by interaction with Ω(L j−1 , X j , Y j ; R j−1 , X j , Y j ) learn W j := L j [1, . . . , j], R j [1, . . . , j] . Clearly, after showing this we are done, as for j := n the adversary can recover S = W n .
The attack works by induction. Trivially for j = 1 we can compute W 1 by retrieving from the leakage oracle L 1 [1] and R 1 [1] . For j ≥ 2 assume that at the end of the (j −1)th iteration the adversary knows W j−1 , and we will show how the adversary can learn W j at the end of the jth iteration. At the end of the jth iteration the adversary A retrieves the following from P L : the value of C 
where (52) and (53) come from the linearity of the inner product, and the rest are simple algebraic transformations. By assumption, the adversary knows W j−1 in (53). Therefore he can also calculate W j .
A FIRST ATTEMPT TO FIXING THE PROBLEM. The main problem with the protocol from Fig. 5 is that the players P L and P R know the values of X and Y (resp.), and therefore they can calculate joint functions on (L, X, Y ) and (R, X, Y ) (resp.). Our method for overcoming this problem is to design a scheme, where X and Y are sent in an "oblivious" way: e.g. the player P R will be able to learn a random X such that L, X = 0, while P L will not learn any additional information on X. One natural idea to implement this, is the following. In Step 1, instead of choosing X randomly, P L chooses a random matrix M in such a way that each column of M is orthogonal to L, which can be expressed algebraically as:
(for simplicity assume that M is a n × n-matrix of rank n − 1). Then P L sends M to P R . In Step 2 player P R calculates X := M · B, where B is a random column vector of length n (in other words: X is a random linear combination of the columns of M ), and sets R := R + X T . By simple linear algebra we have L, X = L, M · B = L · M · B = (0, . . . , 0) · B. Symmetrically, in Step 3 player P R chooses a random n × n-matrixM (of rank n − 1) such thatM · R = (0, . . . , 0). Then, P R sendsM to P R . In Step 4 player P L calculates Y :=Ã·M , whereÃ is a random column vector of length n, and then he sets L := L+Y . Again, it can be easily verified that R , X = 0. This protocol may look secure since obviously P L does not learn X, as (from his point of view) it is a random element sampled from a linear space of vectors orthogonal to L. Unfortunately, now the problem appears on the other side, since P R , after receiving M , can solve (54) and compute L (and similarly P L can compute R fromM ). Hence, this protocol is not better than an (obviously not secure) solution where the players simply send their shares L and R to each other. We also note that attempts to repair this problem by decreasing the rank or the dimension of M andM does not seem to lead to any solution.
